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Abstract It is well-known that highly pathogenic avian
influenza (HPAI) strains can arise from low pathogenic
strains (LPAI) during epidemics in poultry farms. Despite
this, the possibility that partial cross-immunity triggered by
previous exposure to LPAI viruses may reduce the
pathogenicity of HPAI and thus enhance its persistence
has been generally overlooked in both empirical and
theoretical work on avian influenza. We propose a simple
mathematical model to investigate the interacting dynamics
of HPAI and LPAI strains of avian influenza in small-scale
poultry farms. Through the analysis of a deterministic
ordinary differential equations model, we show that: (1) for
a wide range of realistic model parameters, the reduction in
pathogenicity yielded by previous LPAI infection might
allow an HPAI strain that would not be able to persist in a
host population when alone (ℜ0<1) to invade and co-exist
in the host population along with the LPAI strain and (2) the
coexistence between the HPAI and LPAI strains may be
characterized by multiyear periodicity. Because simulations
showed that troughs between epidemics can be deep, with
only a fraction of existing flocks infected by the HPAI
strain, we also ran an individual-based stochastic version of
the dynamical model to analyze the potential for natural
fade-out of the HPAI strain. The analysis of the stochastic
model confirms the prediction that previous exposure to a
LPAI strain can significantly increase the duration of the
epidemics by an HPAI strain before it fades from the
population.
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Introduction
The avian influenza A virus (AI) is a zoonotic pathogen
capable of infecting a wide variety of gallinococcus poultry,
captive birds, and free-ranging wild bird species under
natural and experimental conditions. While waterfowl—
such as wild ducks, gulls, and shorebirds—are the main AI
reservoirs, domestic birds have historically been the source
of cross-species transmission to humans and the cause of
consequent pandemic events (Webster et al. 1992). The
best-known example of transmission to humans is the
H5N1-type avian virus that circulated in Southeast Asia in
the early 2000s (Webster et al. 2006). A better understand-
ing of the ecology of avian influenza viruses is therefore
crucial for developing effective control of future influenza
pandemics.
AI viruses can be classified on the basis of two surface
antigens, the hemagglutining (HA), of which there are 16
subtypes (H1–H16) and the neuraminidase (NA), of which
there are 9 subtypes (N1–N9). The majority of the resulting
144 combinations is maintained in aquatic bird populations
and causes no signs of diseases. The influenza strains
causing mild pathogenicity in domestic birds are called low
pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) viruses. Viruses of the
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H5 and H7 subtypes may cause highly pathogenic avian
influenza in chickens with up to 100% mortality only few
days after infection. These strains are therefore called high
pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) viruses.
HPAI viruses are likely to emerge through mutation or,
more likely, reassortment of LPAI viruses on poultry farms
(Alexander 2007). Results of phylogenetic analysis of the
H7 subtype show that HPAI viruses do not constitute a
separate lineage but seem to arise from LPAI strains (Banks
et al. 2000). The emergence of HPAI during outbreaks of
LPAI strains has been confirmed in several cases on poultry
farms worldwide. An example is the 1983 H5N2 LPAI
outbreak chicken farms in Pennsylvania (USA). The
epidemics started with an LPAI virus that caused low
mortality in poultry farms. Six months later, the same virus
had mutated to become highly pathogenic causing greater
than 80% mortality among birds (Bean et al. 1985). Such a
transformation event also occurred recently in Italy, where
an H7N1 avian influenza epidemic began as an LPAI in
April 1999 and mutated to become HPAI in December of
the same year (Capua et al. 2000). Comparable progres-
sions of HPAI virus have been recorded in Mexico (Garcia
et al. 1996), Pakistan (Naeem 1998), Chile (Rojas et al.
2002), the Netherlands (Elbers et al. 2004), and Canada
(Bowes et al. 2004). The virus can occasionally spill over
from farms to wild bird populations, where HPAI is
believed to be unable to sustain itself (Takekawa et al.
2010). As illustrated by Truscott et al. (2007), HPAI virus
may eventually fade out from a sparse network of poultry
farms after the first epidemic outbreak.
In the past few years, however, a heightened
occurrence of HPAI has been noted, especially in
Southeast Asia, where it is now considered endemic
(Chen et al. 2004; Li et al. 2004). The possibility of its
circulation into free-ranging bird species or its spread
through highly migratory birds has been also considered
(Takekawa et al. 2010). Despite years of empirical data,
laboratory experiments, and theoretical works, the detailed
mechanisms of continuous emergence and persistence of
HPAI viruses—both in free-range, backyards farms and
intensive poultry production facilities—are still controver-
sial and poorly understood.
Two main hypotheses have been formulated to
explain why HPAI viruses have recently tended to
become endemic despite their high pathogenicity. The
first hypothesis is that HPAI virus might be able to
persist in the external environment (Takekawa et al.
2010). Theoretical analyses by Roche et al. (2005),
Rohani et al. (2009), and some experimental studies
(Stallknecht and Brown 2008; Brown et al. 2007)
indicated that some HPAI H5N1 genotypes may persist
long enough in the environment to become part of the
endemic cycles of viruses. The second hypothesis is that
partial cross-immunity triggered by previous exposure
reduces the pathogenicity of HPAI. In this case, infection
by HPAI causes a milder disease in domestic birds, thus
increasing the duration of the epidemics and, in turn, the
chance that the virus is transmitted to other susceptible
farms. Potential for cross-protection has been observed
both in controlled and natural conditions. For instance,
clinical studies analyzed in vitro the interaction between
different avian influenza subtypes and strains. Van der
Goot et al. (2008) and Poetri et al. (2009) showed that
vaccines produced from an H5N2 influenza subtype can
protect ducks and chickens against severe illness and are
able to reduce susceptibility toward a genetically and
antigenically distant H5N1 subtype. These results indicate
that cross-protection is expected not only between influ-
enza strains within the same subtype but also between
different subtypes. Moreover, laboratory experiments
show that hosts previously infected with LPAI H5N2 virus
can survive an infection with HPAI H5N2 virus or can
directly escape the infection (van der Goot et al. 2003),
while fully susceptible animals exposed to HPAI virus
invariably die after infection (Swayne and Halvorson
2003; van der Goot et al. 2003, 2005). Similarly, Kalthoff
et al. (2008) showed that naïve mute swans died shortly
after infection with HPAI H5N1 but those with previous
exposure to LPAI viruses were able to survive without
apparent symptoms. Fereidouni et al. (2009) also showed
that prior infection with low pathogenic H5N2 provided
homosubtype immunity against HPAI H5N1 in waterfowl.
These studies imply that previous infection with LPAI
virus effectively reduces susceptibility of the host to
infection and decreases transmission of HPAI virus,
affecting the course of HPAI not only clinically, but also
epidemiologically. Therefore, the presence of LPAI in the
host population can have a twofold effect (Mannelli et al.
2007). On the one hand, it can increase the HPAI
persistence by lengthening the infectious period. On the
other hand, it can decrease HPAI persistence by reducing
host susceptibility and, consequently, the probability of
new infections. When effects on survival of diseased
individuals overwhelm those on transmission between
infected and susceptible, there is the possibility that unfit
HPAI strains unable to spread in naïve populations may
persist in the presence of LPAI.
While these two hypotheses (i.e., environmental
transmission versus cross-protection) are not mutually
exclusive and several factors or processes probably
contribute to the emergence and persistence of HPAI,
the possibility that partial cross-immunity triggered by
previous exposure to LPAI viruses may reduce the
pathogenicity of HPAI has been generally overlooked
in both empirical and theoretical work of avian
influenza (Webster et al. 2006). The present work was
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specifically aimed at addressing the second of these
hypotheses and was designed to test whether and under
what conditions cross-protection provided by previous
exposure to LPAI infection may permit the persistence of
an HPAI strain that otherwise would rapidly fade out from
the population. The analysis was performed by extending
the classical susceptible–infected–recovered (SIR) frame-
work into a deterministic system of ordinary differential
equations designed to describe the joint dynamics of HPAI
and LPAI viruses and to account for the reduced
pathogenicity of HPAI infections in flocks previously
exposed to LPAI strains. Stability and transient dynamics
of the two-strain model were investigated through a
bifurcation analysis with respect to a realistic range of
possible values of model parameters.
Because the prevalence of HPAI may be very low
between outbreaks, we also developed a stochastic
version of the model (as in Stollenwerk et al. 2004) to
explicitly account for the possibility of a natural fade-out
of the pathogen after an outbreak. In fact, stochastic
models of infectious disease dynamics have shown that
even pathogens that would be able to steadily persist in a
population in a deterministic framework can go extinct by
chance as a consequence of demographic stochasticity. In
the past decade, several studies have explored the
interaction between strain diversity and epidemiological
dynamics in stochastic frameworks (van der Goot et al.
2003; Abu-Raddad and Ferguson 2004; Kirupaharan and
Allen 2004; Stollenwerk et al. 2004; Truscott et al. 2007;
Restif and Grenfell 2006, 2007), but to our knowledge this
is the first attempt to address the epidemiological
consequences of partial cross-immunity in the emergence
of highly pathogenic avian influenza strains. The results of
the stochastic analysis were thus compared to those of the
deterministic version of the model to check for consisten-
cy and differences between the two approaches.
After Bicknell et al. (1999) and Elbakidze (2008), we
applied our analysis to a homogeneous population of
backyard farms where the unit of observation is represented
by the flock/premise. We chose a flock-based model
(instead of an individual-based model) because the spread
of infections in domestic animals is more suitably described
by farm-to-farm than animal-to-animal transmission (e.g.,
Keeling et al. 2003; Tildesley et al. 2006; Mulatti et al.
2010). Moreover, within-farm dynamics during influenza
epidemics are significantly faster than between-farm dy-
namics (Truscott et al. 2007). As a consequence, it is an
acceptable approximation to neglect within-farm dynamics
in the model. In the specific case of avian influenza,
epidemiological investigations of outbreaks in the USA
reveal that the most likely source of infection for domestic
farms is bird-to-bird contact at live birds markets (Garnett
1987; Pelzel et al. 2006), though the possibility of infection
through feed or water contamination, cages, and other
equipment cannot be ruled out. Moreover, several other
studies have emphasized the central role of backyard
poultry flocks in the spread of HPAI virus, both in
developed (e.g., the Netherlands; Bavinck et al. 2009) and
developing countries (e.g., Vietnam; Henning et al. 2009).
Small poultry farms, such as backyard flocks, comprise a
substantial proportion of the total number of poultry farms
in developed countries (more than 94% of US farms have
fewer than 100 birds; Elbakidze 2008). It is therefore
important to concentrate the analysis of avian influenza
dynamics on small-scale farms, which frequently do not
follow to the strict sanitary and biosecurity regulations
(such as isolation and disinfection) applied on large
industrial farms.
Deterministic model
We expand the traditional SIR framework with autonomous
ordinary differential equations to model the effect of LPAI
on HPAI outbreaks on small poultry farms.
Following Iwami et al. (2007), the dynamics of the HPAI
virus when it is isolated (that is, in the absence of
circulation of an LPAI variant) are described by the
following equations:

S ¼ c mS  bHSIH
IH ¼ bHSIH  mþ aHð ÞIH
ð1Þ
where, S and I are the number of susceptible and infected
backyard poultry farms (flocks), respectively; c is the flock
restocking rate [number year−1]; μ is the rate of flock
removal, either because the birds of a flock are sold in the
market or because they die due to causes other then avian
influenza; βH the transmission rate between infected and
susceptible farms; and αH is the additional mortality rate
caused by the HPAI virus.
We have thus assumed that between-flock HPAI trans-
mission occurs at a rate that is linearly related to the
number of infected flocks. As a consequence, the contact
term is given by the force of infection l=βHIH times the
number of susceptible farms. The HPAI flock infectious
period is assumed to be exponentially distributed with mean
durations of (μ+αH)
−1. It is assumed that flocks infected
with the HPAI virus do not recover and all the birds
eventually die.
The dynamics of the LPAI virus when isolated (that is, in
the absence of circulation of an HPAI variant) differ from
that of the HPAI in isolation because LPAI viruses are
assumed to cause negligible disease-induced mortality for
birds. As a consequence, almost all birds infected with
LPAI survive the influenza infection and may develop
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immunity. The LPAI dynamics in isolation can be thus
described by the following SIR model:

S ¼ c mS  bLSILIL ¼ bLSIL  mþ dLð ÞILRL ¼ dLIL  mRL
ð2Þ
where, IL and RL are the LPAI-infected and recovered flocks,
respectively, βL is the between-flock transmission rate, δL is
the LPAI recovery rate, and (μ+δL)
−1 is the mean flock
infectious period. We do not include loss of immunity
processes in the model since the life expectancy of domestic
poultry (about 100 days) is lower than the estimated
immunity period against influenza (about 6 months).
We then assumed that LPAI virus may partially protect
hosts against HPAI strain by acquired immunity as shown by
van der Goot et al. (2003), Pantin-Jackwood and Swayne
(2009), Kalthoff et al. (2008), and Fereidouni et al. (2009).
We also assumed that infected birds with HPAI strains cannot
be infected with LPAI strains since the HPAI infectious period
is too short and the low pathogenicity strain cannot take over
an HPAI-infected host before the host dies (Stegeman et al.
2004; Tiensin et al. 2007). Consequently, individuals
recovered from LPAI that are then infected with HPAI virus
may develop a mild form of highly pathogenic influenza
characterized by either a lower level of transmission and/or
virulence than the full-blown infection (Fig. 1). This new
class of mildly infected individuals was described in the
model as new mild infections (IM). Then, a fraction of these
individuals may recover, developing immunity to both strains
and moving into class RM. When both the LPAI virus and the
HPAI virus are circulating among the poultry farms at the
same time, the epidemiological dynamics can be described
by the following system of equations:

S ¼ c mS  bLSIL  bHS IH þ IMð Þ
IH ¼ bHS IH þ IMð Þ  mþ aHð ÞIH
IL ¼ bLSIL  mþ dLð ÞIL
RL ¼ dLIL  mRL  sbHRL IH þ IMð Þ
IM ¼ sbHRL IH þ IMð Þ  mþ aM þ dMð ÞIM
RM ¼ dMIM  mRM
ð3Þ
where, αM is the additional death rate caused by mild forms
of avian influenza (<<αH), δM is the mild form recovery rate,
mþ aM þ dMð Þ1 is the mean infectious period in flock
carrying mild infections, and σ is the susceptibility reduction
for individuals previously infected with LPAI (RL). As
discussed by Grenfell (2001), there may exist an evolution-
ary trade-off between the duration of infection (specifically,
the additional death rate αH) and susceptibility, the lower the
transmission rate (σβ) the higher the duration of the
infection. Accordingly, we have assumed σ<1 and
mþ aM þ dMð Þ1 > ðmþ aHÞ1.
Stochastic model
Although ordinary differential equation (ODE) models are
useful tools for understanding the dynamics of pathogen
persistence, the treatment of flocks as continuous entities can
produce unrealistic results, such as an extremely low number
of infected flocks during inter-epidemic periods. These
counter-indications can easily be overcome by developing a
stochastic version of the ODE model 3 supporting a discrete
number of flocks (see Gillespie 1977). In agreement with the
assumptions of the deterministic model 3, we introduced
demographic stochasticity at the flock level only. Because
within-farm transmission and prevalence of AI is usually
much higher than between-farm transmission (Savill et al.
2006; Truscott et al. 2007), the stochastic processes that
favor disease fade out may act primarily at the flock level.
Following Durrett and Levin (1994), we assumed that the
biological processes in model 3 occur asynchronously. This
implies that, given the state of the system at time t, the
waiting time for the next event to occur is exponentially
distributed with a rate given by the sum of the rates of all
possible events. In line with these assumptions, we derived
the rules for the transition rates listed in Table 1. We then
performed two sets of stochastic simulations in order to
compare the duration of HPAI outbreaks (1) in the absence
and (2) in the presence of LPAI strains. In the first case, the
initial conditions for the model variables were set to a single
HPAI-infected flock in a totally susceptible population of
poultry farms. In the second case, the initial conditions for
the model variables were set to a single HPAI-infected flock
in a population of poultry farms close to its LPAI-endemic
equilibrium, corresponding to: [S, full-blown infections (IH),
IL, RL, IM, RM]=[S; 1; IL;RL; 0; 0], where S, IL, RL are the
equilibrium values in model 2. We then estimated the
duration of HPAI outbreak in the presence and in the
absence of LPAI virus for different values of the transmission
rates βH and βL by running 10,000 simulations for each
combination of the parameters. The stochastic model was
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Fig. 1 General flow chart of the HPAI-LPAImodel (3). Where IT=IH+IM
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may significantly affect the time to extinction and persistence
of an HPAI strain. Results of the stochastic simulations were
then compared to those of the deterministic version of the
model.
Parameter values and model analysis
The parameter values used for numerical simulations are
summarized in Table 2. We assumed that the number K of
backyard flocks at the disease-free equilibrium is 500 flocks
(i.e., the same order of magnitude observed just before the
LPAI outbreaks in Northern Italy in 2000–2005 by Busani
et al. 2007). Following Iwami et al. (2009), life expectancy
of bird stocks on a small-scale farm (1/μ) was set to
100 days and thus μ=0.274 years−1. Therefore, the
restocking rate is c=μK=27.4 flocks per year. The mean
flock infectious period for HPAI in four recent epidemics
was estimated by Garske et al. (2007) as 2.5–13 days (mean
ca. 7 days), yielding αH=52.1 years
−1. On the other hand,
the mean number of weeks during which a flock remained
infected with LPAI virus was estimated to be about five
yielding δL=10.4 years
−1 (Bos et al. 2009). Van der Goot et
al. (2003) performed infection experiments with HPAI
strains on susceptible chickens and chickens already
infected by LPAI strain showing that LPAI provides
effective protection against infection and mortality caused
by HPAI viruses. In particular, they showed a 100%
survival probability to HPAI infection in hosts already
infected by LPAI (αM=0) and a 40% reduction in effective
transmission in the same hosts (σ=0.4). Unfortunately, we
are unaware of published studies on flock infectious period
for mild influenza infections and so we assumed a flock
infectious period similar to that for LPAI because mild
influenza infections seem nearly asymptomatic (van der
Goot et al. 2003). Therefore, δM was set to 10.4 years
−1.
Despite multiple attempts to assess transmissibility of
LPAI and HPAI viruses in domestic poultry, mechanisms
of influenza virus transmission are poorly understood
(Alexander 2007). To our knowledge, avian influenza
transmission has only been studied at the level of bird-to-
bird contacts under experimental conditions (van der Goot
et al. 2003, 2005). However, there is a considerable gap
between bird-to-bird transmission with a few animals and
the field conditions of within-farm and farm-to-farm
disease spread (as highlighted by Bos et al. 2007). Instead,
information is available on avian influenza basic repro-
duction number (ℜ0)—the average number of secondary
infections caused by the primary case in a totally
susceptible population—which is positively correlated to
virus transmission (Anderson and May 1991). If ℜ0>1, a
typical infective gives rise, on average, to more than one
secondary infection, leading to an epidemic. On the contrary,
if ℜ0<1, the pathogen cannot establish in the population and
eventually goes extinct. Since the ability of the virus to
spread is related to the amount of pathogen released by an
infected individual, it is possible that relatively little virus is
released during the course of HPAI infections because of the
Table 1 Rules for the transition
rates in the stochastic model
X=(S, IH, IL, RL, IM, RM); other
variables and parameters have
the same meaning as in (3)
Transition rule Rate Event
S→S+1 c Restocking
X→X−1 μX Natural death
S, IH→S−1, IH+1 βHS (IH+IM) Full-blown HPAI infection
S, IL→S−1, IL+1 βLSIL LPAI infection
IH→IH−1 αHIH Disease-induced death
IL, RL→IL−1, RL+1 δLIL Loss of LPAI infection
RL,IM→RL−1, IM+1 σβHRL (IH+IM) Mild HPAI infection
IM, RM→IM−1, RM+1 δMIM Loss of mild HPAI infection
Table 2 Parameter values for
model (3)
y years, see the main text for
more details
Parameter Symbol Value
Restocking rate c 137 farm×year−1
Mortality rate μ 0.274 year−1
HPAI induced mortality αH 52.1 year
−1
LPAI recovery rate δL 10.4 year
−1
Mild-HPAI induced mortality αM 0
Mild-HPAI recovery rate δM 10.4 year
−1
Transmission reduction in LPAI recovered σ 0.4
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extremely rapid deaths of infected birds. A poorer infected-
to-susceptible transmission is therefore expected in HPAI
viruses than in LPAI (Alexander 2007). Estimates for the
HPAI basic reproduction number ℜ0 (H) show high
variability in the force of infection, ranging from 0.9 to 2.5
in Bouma et al. (2009), from 1.9 to 2.7 in Ward et al. (2009),
and from 1.1 to 3.2 in Garske et al. (2007). The LPAI basic
reproduction number ℜ0 (L) also shows high variability
ranging from 2.3 to 3.9 (Marangon et al. 2007). Therefore, in
order to overcome the lack of information on and uncertainty
in transmission parameters, we performed a sensitivity analysis
of infection persistence over a wide range of transmission rates
(and thus ofℜ0) of both HPAI and LPAI viruses.
Results
Deterministic model results
In the specific case of a system of K susceptible backyard
farms, the basic reproduction number ℜ0 (H) for HPAI
alone [model 1] can be computed as follows (van den
Driessche and Watmough 2002; Iwami et al. 2007):
<0ðHÞ ¼ bHKmþ aHð Þ ð4Þ
while ℜ0 (L) for model 2 when LPAI is isolated is:
<0ðLÞ ¼ bLKmþ dLð Þ : ð5Þ
However, as observed in several HPAI outbreaks by
Alexander (2000) and Koch and Elbers (2006), LPAI
viruses are usually already endemic when a highly
pathogenic mutant arises or a backyard farm is infected
by an introduced HPAI-infected bird. As a consequence,
some portion of the host population has already been
infected and recovered from the LPAI virus, thus develop-
ing partial resistance to HPAI. Therefore, the best measure
to estimate HPAI persistence success in this scenario is the




defined as the total number of new HPAI infectious cases
from a single infectious case in an LPAI-endemic popula-
tion. The invasion reproduction number is a measure of the
relative fitness of one strain when another strain is already
established in the population and is considered as a
competitive condition, which represents the advantage of
the HPAI [LPAI] strain against the LPAI [HPAI] strain. If the
invasion reproduction numbers of a strain is less than one,
then the strain dies out and only the other strain persists. On
the other hand, if both invasion reproduction numbers are
greater than one, then both strains can coexist. In the
specific case of model 3, the invasion reproduction number
of the HPAI strain when the LPAI infection is at its endemic







mþ aM þ dMð Þ ð6Þ
where, ℜ0 (H) and ℜ0 (L) are the single-strain basic
reproduction numbers defined in (4) and (5), respectively;
ℜ0 (H)/ℜ0 (L) is the expected number of full-blown infections
(IH) from a single HPAI infectious case (mild or full-blown) in
an LPAI-endemic population; sbHRL= mþ aM þ dMð Þ is the
expected number of IM from a single HPAI infectious case
(mild or full blown) in an LPAI-endemic population; RL ¼
dL <0ðLÞ  1ð Þ=bL is the number of LPAI immune flocks at
model 2 endemic equilibrium. Then, we expect a mutant
HPAI virus to invade in an LPAI-endemic landscape only if its




> 1. Interestingly, according to Eq. 6, an HPAI
strain can invade an established LPAI strain when its basic




> 1 and <0ðHÞ < 1, the parametric condition
under which HPAI may establish in the presence of LPAI
strains while it would go extinct in a naïve host population
can be derived by rearranging Eq. 6 as follows:




Therefore, by assuming an LPAI infectious period signif-
icantly shorter than the host life expectancy (δL>>μ), we may
expect an unfit HPAI strain [i.e., with ℜ0(H)<1] to spread
successfully when the number of secondary mild infections
in a population close to its carrying capacity ℜ0(M) is larger
than one. Moreover, as bHK < mþ aHð Þ for ℜ0 (H)<1 [see
(4)], we may expect an unfit HPAI strain to spread in a
population when its full-blown infectious period (μ+αH)
−1 is
appreciably shorter than the duration of a mild infection
mþ aM þ dMð Þ1. Interestingly, Grenfell (2001) showed
that the last condition usually holds when mild infections
imply reduced host susceptibility (i.e., σ<1) as in model 3.
In order to assess LPAI persistence or exclusion after a
successful HPAI invasion in model 3, we computed the





An LPAI strain may persist in a population success-




only if LPAI has a larger basic reproduction number than
HPAI).
While persistence conditions can be handled analytically,
the complete model 3 dynamics are too complex to be
28 Theor Ecol (2012) 5:23–35
investigated with analytical tools. Therefore, the remainder
of the analyses were carried out through bifurcation
methods performed numerically via specialized software
implementing continuation techniques, such as LOCBIF
(Khibnik et al. 1993) and CONTENT (Kuznetsov 1998).
Figure 2 shows the model 3 bifurcation diagram in the
parameter space of the basic reproduction numbers ℜ0 (H)
and ℜ0 (L) as this summarizes conditions for coexistence
and exclusion of the two strains as a function of the other
epidemiological parameters entering ℜ0 (i) computation,
such as the transmission rates βi. The horizontal axis [ℜ0
(L)=1] represents the HPAI dynamics for different values of
basic reproduction number in the absence of LPAI viruses
as described in model 1. Curve TH represents the threshold




¼ 1) that separates region A in which the HPAI
fails to establish itself from region C in which the HPAI
strain is able to invade the host population converging
toward a coexistence equilibrium with the LPAI strain.
Similarly, curve TL represents the threshold for LPAI strain




separates region B in which the LPAI fails to establish itself
from the coexistence region C. Curve H (Hopf bifurcation)
separates the coexistence equilibrium region C (endemic
dynamics) from region D, where model 3 exhibits sustained
cycles in abundance of both pathogen strains (epidemic
dynamics). The thin lines give the expected cycle lengths in
regions where cycles occur (in years).
As highlighted in (7), Fig. 2 shows that, when LPAI in
endemic the host population (i.e., ℜ0 (H) ℜ0 (L)>1), HPAI
outbreaks may occur even when ℜ0 (H)<1. Furthermore,
such outbreaks may exhibit inter-annual periodicity with
large peaks of infection every 5–10 years (dark gray
region).
Stochastic model results
Stochastic models are useful for investigating pathogen
extinction (self-limiting epidemic) or persistence (long-term
epidemic) in the host population. We assessed whether the
presence of LPAI strains affects the time to extinction for an
unfit HPAI strain with ℜ0 (H)≤1.
The gray region in Fig. 3 shows the area in the parameter
space [ℜ0 (H), ℜ0 (L)] where HPAI epidemics in the
presence of LPAI are longer than HPAI epidemics in an
initially naïve population at its carrying capacity K=c/μ.
Ten thousand replicates were run for each set of parameter
values. For each replicate, simulations were run until HPAI-
infected individuals no longer existed in the population.
Gray areas represent the combination of [ℜ0 (H), ℜ0 (L)]
values for which the average duration of HPAI epidemics in
the presence of LPAI is 50% (light gray) and 100%
(dark gray) longer, respectively, than HPAI epidemics in
an initially naïve population (i.e., a population not
previously exposed to LPAI viruses). The black curve
represents the invasion threshold derived through the
deterministic model 3.
Although results of the differential equation model are
dependent on the treatment of individuals as continuous
entities, analogous behaviors are observed in the stochastic
system with discrete individuals when a pathogen is
introduced into an LPAI-endemic population. The invasion
of an HPAI strain into an LPAI-endemic population often











Fig. 3 Light and dark gray regions identify the combination of [ℜ0 (H),
ℜ0 (L)] values where the average duration of HPAI epidemics in
the presence of LPAI are 50% and 100% longer than the duration
of HPAI epidemics in a naïve population, respectively. Simulations
of infectious dynamics were replicated 10,000 times for each set
of parameter values [ℜ0 (H), ℜ0 (L)]. All model parameters are
held constant apart from the transmission rates βH and βL as in
Fig. 2. Black curve (TH) represents the invasion threshold computed
as in model 3. The farm population size is c/μ=500. Other
parameters as in Table 2















Fig. 2 Model 3 bifurcation diagram in the (ℜ0 (H), ℜ0 (L)) space. All
parameters are held constant apart from the transmission rates βH and
βL. TH: threshold for HPAI strain establishment; TL: threshold for LPAI
strain establishment; H: Hopf bifurcation. In region A only LPAI
persists, B only HPAI persists, C endemic coexistence, D epidemic
coexistence. The thin lines give the expected cycle lengths in regions
where cycles occur. Other parameters as in Table 2
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Discussion
We explored the epidemiological dynamics and persis-
tence of high pathogenicity avian influenza and its
interaction with low pathogenicity avian influenza. The
analysis was carried out using two techniques: determin-
istic dynamics and stochastic simulations. These two
approaches provide complementary predictions on the
fate of the two strains. They both show that the presence
of low pathogenicity strains plays a crucial role in
determining the fate of high pathogenicity avian influen-
za, enhancing both its probability of persistence and the
duration of its epidemics. In fact, as hosts already
infected by LPAI strains may experience milder symp-
toms of HPAI, the presence of LPAI strains increases the
disease infectious period [see (7)]; this allows the
persistence of HPAI strains even when their basic repro-
duction number in naïve populations is lower than one.
The possibility that HPAI exposure may yield a mild
infection due to the partial cross-immunity conferred by
LPAI has been well documented in laboratory experiments
with caged chickens (van der Goot et al. 2003, 2005): these
studies show that LPAI-positive birds survived to a HPAI
infection. In the field, low mortality was reported during a
HPAI outbreak in Chile in 2002 (Verdugo et al. 2009).
We investigated avian influenza dynamics only among
domestic birds. Obviously, the effect of wild bird
migration is also considered an important risk factor for
disease spread (Normile 2005). However, some H5N1
cases in poultry have been reported in countries in which
infections are not associated with migratory bird move-
ments (Kilpatrick et al. 2006). Therefore, the exclusion of
wild birds from our analysis does not invalidate model
results.
The ecological literature contains numerous examples of
cross-protection mechanisms that favor strain coexistence
(Castillo-Chavez et al. 1989; Andreasen et al. 1997).
Moreover, other theoretical work shows that, in specific
conditions, cross-immunity may favor strain coexistence
even in the case of unfit invading mutants (i.e., with basic
reproduction number lower than one) as in model 3 (White
et al. 1998; Nuño et al. 2007). White et al. (1998) showed
that in the presence of cross-immunity, persistence of unfit,
nonlethal strains is possible when transmission rates of
secondary infections are greater than transmission rates of
primary infections. Nuño et al. (2007) showed that when
infected individuals are isolated, cross-immunity may favor
the coexistence of human influenza strains even in the case
of unfit invading mutants. Here, we showed that in the case
of avian influenza on poultry farms where previous
conditions do not apply, highly pathogenic unfit strains
can also invade and establish in a partially immune
population.
Cross-immunity may generate persistence of unfit strains
(with R0<1) through the emergence of so-called backward
bifurcations (Greenhalgh et al. 2000). Typically, infection
models show a smooth stability change (i.e., a smooth
increase in prevalence) at the disease persistence threshold
(called forward bifurcation) in which an endemic equilib-
rium with few infected individual arises. However, in the
presence of cross-immunity, infection models may exhibit
backward bifurcations in which an endemic equilibrium
coexists with the disease-free equilibrium for transmis-
sion rates lower than threshold persistence, R0=1
(Greenhalgh et al. 2000). In some cases, uncontrolled
epidemic systems that exhibit forward bifurcations may
produce backward bifurcations after the implementation of
vaccine policies introducing partial immunity into the host
population (Kribs-Zaleta and Velasco-Hernandez 2000;
Arino et al. 2003).
Our analysis shows that while each strain would go
toward a stable endemic equilibrium when alone (or, in the
case of HPAI virus, would possibly fade out), the interact-
ing dynamics of LPAI- and HPAI-infected flocks may give
rise to multiyear periodicity with high epidemic peaks and
low prevalence, inter-epidemic periods ranging from few to
several years. While it is unlikely that the HPAI infection
would persist with boom-and-bust dynamics for several
years in a poultry farm system (due to the limited number
of exposed farms), the presence of large oscillations in the
epidemiological dynamics may imply a larger epidemic
wave during disease invasion. Similar patterns of dumped
oscillations or limit cycles with high epidemic picks and
deep troughs have been observed in other multistrain
models with cross-immunity including whooping cough
(Restif and Grenfell 2006), dengue (Ferguson et al. 1999),
malaria (Gupta et al. 1994), and human influenza (Ferguson
et al. 2003; Casagrandi et al. 2006; Koelle et al. 2006).
Typical multistrain models consider two or more strains
with similar phenotypic traits (infectious period and
transmission rate) and different degrees of cross-
protection. For instance, Andreasen et al. (1997) showed
that sustained oscillations may occur in simple human
influenza models of three or more strains. In the present
case of avian influenza, sustained oscillations arose through
Hopf bifurcations for two strains with remarkable differ-
ences in pathogenicity and some level of cross-immunity.
The analysis of our stochastic LPAI–HPAI model showed
that the invasion of an HPAI strain into an LPAI-endemic
population may lead to longer epidemics than in the case of
a totally susceptible population; this effect is greater for
LPAI infection with larger basic reproduction number (see
Fig. 3). The presence of partially immune individuals
previously exposed to LPAI resulted in a lower HPAI force
of infection; thus, instead of generating boom-and-bust
epidemics leading to fast extinction, HPAI generates a
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smaller epidemic with a less dramatic depletion of
individuals. This may allow the pathogen to persist in the
population for longer periods of time. While we do not rule
out other mechanisms fostering HPAI persistence—such as
the mutation of HPAI viruses toward less virulent strains or
an increase in connectivity and size of the susceptible
populations—we note that our predictions are consistent
with recent reports that HPAI strains have become endemic
in China (Alexander 2007).
Grenfell (2001) obtained comparable results with an SIR
framework describing the so-called invasion–persistence
trade-off, while King et al. (2009) generalized their finding
in a metapopulation framework. They suggested that
virulent strains with short infectious period and high
transmission rate (as in the full-blown HPAI infection)
display competitive advantages spreading faster in the host
population than strains with longer infectious period and
lower instantaneous transmission rate (as in the mild HPAI
infection). On the other hand, more transmissible strains
suffer greater risk of fade out exhibiting epidemic dynamics
with larger boom-and-bust fluctuations. Thus, invasion
advantages for more virulent strains come at the cost of
diminished persistence probability (Grenfell 2001). Grenfell
et al. found that the invasion–persistence trade-off may
produce selective pressures favoring the persistence of
strains with intermediate virulence. In light of this, we
believe that a specific function linking reduction of
susceptibility and duration of infection (that is, the
additional death rate) could be introduced into model 3 to
analyze the evolutionary proprieties of the system following
game theoretic (Metz et al. 1996) or quantitative genetics
(Day and Proulx 2004) approaches. This issue will be
object of further investigations.
Savill et al. (2006) demonstrated a similar phenome-
non by modeling the H5N1 avian influenza introduction
into partially vaccinated poultry populations. By using a
detailed stochastic model, the authors showed that partial
vaccination could promote undetected pathogen persis-
tence facilitating the spread of avian influenza to neigh-
boring farms. In the same way, Pulliam et al. (2007a)
predicted, with deterministic and stochastic analyses,
longer epidemic events when a human pathogen (such as
measles and rubella) is introduced or reintroduced into a
partially immune population. They called this phenome-
non epidemic enhancement. Some evidence for this effect
has also been found in the field. Analyzing livestock
production data following the Nipah encephalitis outbreak
on Malaysian pig farms (1998–1999), Pulliam et al.
(2007b) found that previous Nipah virus introduction
produced partial immunity in pigs, which led to a more
widespread and persistent epidemic than would have been
observed if the pig population had been entirely naïve
(Pulliam et al. 2007b).
An alternative mechanism proposed for avian influ-
enza persistence, especially in wild waterfowl, is
transmission from propagules (i.e., viral particles) that
persist for long periods of time outside of the host in
the environment (“environmental transmission”). By
using deterministic and stochastic models of avian
influenza in waterfowl, Rohani et al. (2009) showed
that a very low rate of environmental transmission
(relative to rates of direct transmission) may dramatically
increase the probability of pathogen persistence providing
a parsimonious explanation for the observed epidemic
pattern of avian influenza in the wild. Therefore, we may
expect similar effects in domestic birds, where the virus
spreads through direct bird-to-bird contact as well as
through indirect contact via contaminated feed, equip-
ment, water, and personnel. The potential presence of
alternative transmission routes in domestic avian influenza
may favor the persistence of strains with low bird-to-bird
basic reproduction numbers (Roche et al. 2005).
The interacting dynamics of HPAI and LPAI investigated
in the present paper may suggest an alternative mechanism
to explain HPAI circulation in the wildlife. LPAI viruses
have been isolated from at least 105 wild bird species of 26
different families (Olsen et al. 2006), but waterfowl birds,
such as the Anseriformes (particularly ducks, geese, and
swans) and Charadriiformes (particularly gulls, terns, and
waders), constitute the major natural LPAI virus reservoir.
In these species, LPAI viruses may attain a significant
prevalence and generally cause no evident clinical signs.
HPAI infections were not detected in the wild before 2002
but in the past decade, HPAI H5N1 viruses have been
reported in more than 100 species of wild birds (USGS
2008) usually found dead or diseased. A number of free-
living wildfowl species, including mallard ducks and bar-
headed geese, have been shown to asymptomatically shed a
large number of viral propagules for several days without
exhibiting any apparent clinical signs or prior to the onset
of illness. Despite such great inter- and intraspecific
variability in the susceptibility to, and virulence of, HPAI
viruses (reviewed by Pantin-Jackwood and Swayne 2009),
HPAI outbreaks are believed to be self-limiting in wildlife
and to be triggered by spillover from gallinaceous poultry
(Webster et al. 2007). Outbreaks of HPAI virus at Qinghai
Lake in 2005–2006 and Poyang Lake in 2006 demonstrate
that dense congregation of wild birds at feeding or
reproductive sites may counteract barriers to HPAI trans-
mission (Takekawa et al. 2010). Given recurrent outbreaks
in wildlife in the past 5 years, it has been questioned
whether highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses are becoming
endemic in wild waterfowl (Webster et al. 2007). In this
respect, a crucial issue that remains unaddressed is the
possible effect of cocirculating influenza viruses in wild
birds on the pathogenicity of HPAI viruses (Webster et al.
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2006). We ran other simulations by extending our flock-
based model to describe the epidemiological dynamics of a
self-limiting, free-ranging wild bird population character-
ized by logistic growth when disease free. The results of
this additional analysis (not reported here) show that the
main conclusions of the present work—i.e., (a) persistence
of an otherwise unfit HPAI virus when LPAI is endemic and
(b) potential for inter-annual periodicity when the two
strains are both present—also hold true for the dynamics of
avian influenza in wild bird populations. As a consequence,
partial cross-protection provided by previous exposure to
LPAI could theoretically allow HPAI to become entrenched
in wild waterfowl cycles, without necessarily requiring
repeated spill-over from domestic poultry to explain inter-
annual boom-and-bust dynamics of HPAI in wildlife.
Another important aspect in the spread of HPAI is
that an increase in life expectancy of an HPAI-infected
bird previously exposed to LPAI strains may allow
migrant birds to fly long distances before the onset of
the disease. For instance, during the asymptomatic
period, bar-headed geese can potentially fly over
500 km (Gaidet et al. 2010) suggesting that they could
serve as long-distance carriers spreading HPAI between
distant populations and/or species. Periodic aggregation
around common feeding sites for overwintering or during
migration may also provide opportunities for HPAI to
infect a large number of species and individuals. As
migration and aggregation usually occur in predictable
temporal patterns, it is therefore crucial that seasonality in
contact rates be accounted for in future modeling effort of
wild bird avian influenza. Several theoretical and empir-
ical works have shown that the explicit inclusion of
periodic forcing in models of wildlife disease may
important for accurately describing epidemics of wildlife
in strongly seasonal environments (Altizer et al. 2006;
Bolzoni et al. 2008). Reproduction, for instance, is another
seasonal process that could play a crucial role in the
dynamics of avian influenza in the wild. In fact, the
reproductive pulse of immunologically naïve young birds
in breeding sites can potentially cause higher HPAI
prevalence and bird losses (Hénaux et al. 2010).
Our analysis was primarily applied to a homogeneous
population of flocks (or wild birds) under the constraints of
limited availability of data on contact rates. While this, in
itself, is a valuable exercise, the ultimate goal will be to
apply this framework to a heterogeneous system of poultry
farms (or a metapopulation of wild birds) where flocks (or
wild bird populations) differ in species, size, and connec-
tivity. This effort would resemble that of Truscott et al.
(2007) who described the dynamics of single-strain HPAI
epidemics in the network of poultry farms in Great Britain.
Several other important heterogeneities were not included
in our modeling exercise, such as more detailed structure of
contact processes, species-specific susceptibility, within-
flock dynamics, seasonality in transmission rates, and strain
evolution. For example, the dynamics of influenza evolu-
tion are intrinsically transient in the sense that new types
are continuously introduced while old types die out. A
multistrain approach, such as that developed by Gog and
Grenfell (2002), would help to provide a more realistic
description of epidemiological dynamics and of the role of
cross-protection.
We deliberately kept our model as simple as possible so
as to analyze specifically the role of cross-immunity
acquired through infection with LPAI viruses in the
persistence of an unfit HPAI virus that would otherwise
rapidly fade out. Whether through mutation/reassortment or
through cross-protection, HPAI viruses seem to need LPAI
infection to invade and persist in a system of poultry farms.
Webster et al. (2006) observed that clinical signs of
infection with highly pathogenic viruses may be masked
by cross-protection by LPAI strains, a fact largely over-
looked in the analysis of epidemiological data on avian
influenza, both in domestic poultry and in wild bird
species. While further field work and laboratory research
is required to cast light on this question, our theoretical
work shows that this is indeed a potential mechanisms for
the persistence of highly pathogenic viruses of avian
influenza and that, under specific circumstances, such
cross-protection may trigger complex dynamics exhibiting
multiyear periodicity.
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Appendix 1: Computation of the HPAI invasion
reproduction number
We define the invasion reproduction number of the HPAI as
the spectral radius of the “next generation” matrix FV−1
(Diekmann et al. 1990), that is: <0ðHÞ

L
¼ r FV1ð Þ,
where F and V are defined as a Jacobian matrix of the rate
of appearance of new HPAI infections (f) and the Jacobian
matrix of other rates of transfer (v) calculated for infected
compartments (i.e., IH and IM ) in the LPAI-endemic
equilibrium [S, IH, IL, RL, IM, RM]=[S; 0; IL;RL; 0; 0], where
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and v ¼ mþ aHð ÞIH
mþ aM þ dMð ÞIM
" #
;
where, IT=IH+IM. The Jacobian matrices at the LPAI-
endemic equilibrium are as follows:
F ¼ bHS bHS
sbHRL sbHRL
" #
andV ¼ mþ aH 0
0 mþ aM þ dM
" #
Then, the next generation matrix FV−1 is:
FV1 ¼ 1
mþ aHð Þ mþ aM þ dMð Þ
 bHS mþ aM þ dMð Þ bHS mþ aHð Þ
sbHRL mþ aM þ dMð Þ sbHRL mþ aHð Þ
" #




¼ r FV1  ¼ bHS
mþ aHð Þ þ
sbHRL
mþ aM þ dMð Þ
¼ <0ðHÞ<0ðLÞ þ
sbHRL
mþ aM þ dMð Þ :
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